THE EVOLUTION of the NOTION of SECURITY

Abstract

The notion of ‘security’ has evolved significantly in security studies. Traditionally, the notion of security was primarily on military threats to the territorial integrity of states. After the end of the Cold War, the notion of security -in terms of both security objects and security threats- has broadened and deepened to include not only -military threats to states but also non-military threats to groups and individuals. Within this context, the aim of this paper is to examine the conceptual debate on the evolution of the security notion. By doing so this article also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the literature by analyzing conceptual approaches to the notion of security.

Key words: The notion of security, collective security, intervention

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Özet


Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik kavramı, kollektif güvenlik, müdahale.

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1- INTRODUCTION

The term "security" has become a popular phrase over the last sixty years. Its use has increased over a wide variety of relational levels; national, or international. Over these years, the notion of security has evolved significantly in security studies. Traditionally, the notion of security was primarily on military threats to the territorial integrity of states. In other words, security is defined in military terms, with the primary focus on state protection from threats to national interests.

During the Cold War era, security was overwhelmingly a matter of the state’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity and its political autonomy. After the end of the Cold War, the notion of security in terms of both security objects and security threats has broadened and deepened to include not only military threats to states but also non-military threats to groups and individuals. Globalization has also played an important role in transforming the notion of security by increasing the interconnectedness between societies and states and by decreasing the capacity of any state to counter security threats and risks alone.

In parallel with these developments, the notion of security has been discussed and redefined by the academia extensively. Within this context, the aim of this paper is to examine the conceptual debate on the evolution of the security notion. By doing so this article also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the literature by analyzing conceptual approaches to the notion of security.

2- The Notion of Security

The end of the Cold War brought about a very dynamic debate on the notion of security. During the almost fifty years of the bipolar world, the very strong imprint of realism in international relations thinking explicitly identified the study of security with the study of national security. Hans J. Morgenthau's and Kenneth N. Waltz's thinking represented the clearest basis upon which the notion of national security has been anchored (Morgenthau, 1948 & Waltz, 1959). In an anarchical system of self-help there is no other possible security than the one provided by the state itself. Even though since the mid-seventies concern over the very narrow approach of realism on the concept of security steadily grew in American academic circles, it was only until the end of the Cold War that a forceful debate in order to broaden the frontiers of the security concept took place.

In the 1970s Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye proposed in Power and Interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1989) not only that cooperation under conditions of anarchy was possible, but also that security issues were not always at the forefront of the agenda. The concept of complex interdependence meant that there is not a hierarchy of issues in interstate relationships and that military force is not always an appropriate tool. Nonetheless that the strong Hobbesian grip had been relaxed, national security, understood as the lack of an armed threat against the state, was left untouched.

During the 1980s, the renewal of interest in security studies, mainly due to the breakdown of detente and the restoration of the Cold War, did not represent a profound change in the way this field had been dealt with. Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones while reviewing the views expressed in the conference "The Past, Present and Future of International Security Studies" that took place in February of 1987 (Nye and Jones, 1988: 5-27), considered that the future of international security studies remained unclear. In their opinion, while there
was a renewed interest in the field due to the increased risk of US-Soviet confrontation that stimulated new sources for research founding and young interested scholars, the field had problems: the lack of theoretical innovation, the narrow approach of strategic studies, policy fads, ethnocentrism and shortage of good data. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones had basically been assessing the situation of American security studies and proposed a change within the established parameters: to enrich the security studies field with the political, economic and historic context that security studies had been lacking of. Stephen M. Walt, in his article "The Renaissance of Security Studies" (Walt, 1991:211-39) published in 1991, in explaining the reasons that propelled the new interest and the new themes that scholars had researched since the mid-seventies through the eighties, put on the table the fact that although the debate and the themes were expanding, the main trust of the security studies field continued to be, in words of David A. Baldwin, "the use of military means to meet military threats." (Baldwin, 1996:117-41)

Without a doubt, there were voices during the 1980s that announced the challenge that the traditional security studies school would face in the 1990s. Richard H. Ullman considered, in a pioneering article published in 1983 (Ullman, 1983:129-53), that American national security had been defined in excessively narrow military terms and he proposed a re-definition of threats in order for national security to encompass conflicts related to territory and those arising from a worldwide demand for resources. Ullman was thinking, for example, of immigration from the Third World to the United States. Carolyn M. Stephenson announced in 1988 that "the breakdown of models of security which have been widely conceived of as protecting people and nations appears to be imminent"(Stephenson, 1988:55-76). The factors that in her opinion were the leitmotiv of this breakdown were, among others: nuclear deterrence was not working, arms control was not working, disarmament by itself could be unsteady, international legal and organizational regimes were experiencing problems, hegemonic stability was eroding and modern warfare was more destructive and pervasive.

Robert A. Rubinstein proposed in a 1988 article to enrich the realist paradigm with anthropological literature. Thus, Rubinstein proposed to recognize that if a community conducts international security work, the social and cultural dynamics affect the decisions taken by the members of that community (Rubinstein, 1988:529-42).

Notwithstanding these early signs, the strongest challenge to the traditional notion of national security was going to be pushed by the end of the Cold War. New approaches towards the issue of national security have come to the table, many of them challenging the traditional realist perspective.

First, there were those who wanted to expand the concept of national security beyond military threats. Among other authors who advocated a broadening of the concept of national security, is Jessica Tuchman Mathews who in 1989 proposed to enlarge the concept in order to include resource, environmental and demographic issues (Tuchmann, 1989:162-77), and Neville Brown who argued in the same year in favor of the attention strategic studies should put towards "the ecological threat to peace" (Brown, 1989:519-32). In 1991 Neta Crawford proposed to debate:
In 1992 Edward A. Kolodziej advocated a broad and inclusive notion of security. In proposing a more encompassing notion, this scholar rested his case on the proposal of international security systems, which have three essential functions: a) survival of the state; b) arbitration of personal and group demands, and c) facilitator of the production and distribution of goods. These functions extend the notion of security from the survival of the state to the interdependence of the material welfare of the globe's population, to threats to personal and group freedoms and interests within a state (Kolodziej, 1992:1-31).

Barry Buzan is another example of those who wish to expand the concept of security beyond military threats. In *People, States and Fear. A n Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (1991), Buzan proposes that "national security" suggests that the idea of a focus in the political and military sectors, where the state is most strongly established, cannot be properly understood without including the actors and dynamics from the societal, economic and environmental sectors (Buzan, 1991:363). There is also a relaxation of the notion of anarchy in Buzan's proposed term "mature anarchy." He asserts that security cannot be achieved by individuals or states acting solely on their own behalf, and that some collective measures are necessary among the members of the system if each of them is to achieve security (Buzan, 1991: 379). Notwithstanding its connections with the different levels of analysis, security continues to be mainly considered as national security. In 1998 Barry Buzan co-authored with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde the book *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* in which the notion of international security continued to be at the sidelines:

By international security we mainly mean relations between collective units and how those are reflected upw ard into the system. We keep the term *international* despite its ambiguities, both because it is an established usage and because its ambiguities hint at multisectorality ('nation rather than state') (Buzan and others, 1998:208).

Furthermore, in 1998 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde decided not to study the global or the international levels, but to study the regional one; in their analysis the end of bipolarity "had removed the principal organizing force at the global level" (Buzan and others, 1998:9) and therefore the regions, with their rising capabilities, were called to sort their own affairs. As in 1991 in *People, States and Fear*, in 1998 the underlying assumption was the relaxation of the notion of anarchy in the international system and the notion of interdependence. These gave way to the security complex concept, defined as "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan and others, 1988:12. Under this perspective there was no place for the study of the notion of international security. In 2003, in *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever looked for the empirical testing of the regional security complex theory; their chosen level of analysis was the regional one. The concept of international security did not have a place, for once again the basic assumption of the analysis was the anarchical character of the international system. Furthermore, given the anarchical character of the international system both authors considered that regional security complexes were an expected substructure (Buzan and Waever, 2003:40). While in 1998 the levels of analysis were:
international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals; in 2003, in the context of the regional security complex theory, the levels were: domestic, state, regional and global and the international level disappeared. The presumption of anarchy in the international system excluded the possibilities of order, organization and rules at the international level. Buzan and Ole Waever seem to be more comfortable going directly from the regional to the global level where at this stage there are no clear lines for the behavior of the actors.

In a second group, there were those who undertook a critical revision of the notion of security that had prevailed and tried to uncover its foundations and its inner dynamics, for example Bradley S. Klein and James Der Derian. In Strategic Studies and World Order (Klein, 1994:x), published in 1994, the main concern of Bradley S. Klein is to consider how the realist presentation of strategic studies covers the uncertainties of post-modernist political-military practices. Bradley S. Klein makes a deep examination of US military practices and in so doing, he uncovers the US national security discourse.

In a third trend were those who brought to the analysis of security, in the words of Michael C. Desch, the tradition of cultural studies (Desch, 1998:141-70). For example, The Culture of National Security edited by Peter J. Katzenstein in 1996, emphasized, as its title clearly expresses, culture and identity as important determinants of national security (Katzenstein, 1996). By underlining culture and identity as important components of national security, Peter J. Katzenstein is a proponent of a broadening of the national security concept.

Fourth, in 1989 a new way to understand international relations was opened. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf published in that year World of Our Making (Onuf, 1989), a book that can be understood as a reaction to the postmodernist debate in the field, for from Onuf's point of view postmodernism followed a dead end path. It was not enough to uncover and to de-construct reality; there was also the need to construct it: "I call this position constructivism. In simplest terms, people and societies construct, or constitute, each other" (Onuf, 1989:36). Without detailing Onuf's proposal, it is important to underline two elements. First, constructivism makes an epistemological turn in international relations, for the process of knowledge is embedded in the construction of reality and vice versa. Second, Onuf's constructivism rejects the idea of anarchy as the central and defining feature of international relations. In 1992, Alexander Wendt published the article "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics" (Wendt, 1992) through which he opened, in a decisive way, the school of constructivism in international relations. It must be said, however, that Alexander Wendt kept fundamental realist elements, for his goal was to build a bridge between neo-liberals (Keohane) and neo-realists (Waltz). However, the notions of power politics, anarchy and self-help were moderated:

I argue that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992:394-95).

Furthermore, Alexander Wendt maintained another fundamental neo-realist notion, the one of the state as a rational and unitary actor: "I assume that a theoretically productive analogy can be made between individuals and states" (Wendt, 1992:397). In 1999, Alexander Wendt published his book Social Theory of International Politics(Wendt, 1999) in which he detailed and refined the path that he had opened in 1992.
As a new school of thought in international relations, constructivism has provided the field with the possibility of change; not a minor contribution, for as can be recalled, realism's fundamentals deprive international relations field from the ideas of progress and change. Constructivism has also allowed a direct dialogue between structure and superstructure — between reality and ideas—. Even though constructivism has not dealt directly with the security issue, its epistemological approach opens the path to new research in this area.

The authors who have been reviewed did not give a great deal of attention to the notion of international security. Notwithstanding the fact that some of them touched the margins of the debate between national security and international security, because by proposing the broadening of the national security concept they touched issues that by their current nature have an international dimension, they remained for the most part on the national security realist paradigm. This is, however, understandable. In the very long lasting realist tradition, international security has been for a long time in conceptual contradiction with the notion of national security. Even though the term security is frequently accompanied by the word international, ‘international security’ appears to lack an accurate meaning, maybe because of a heritage of the eighties’ decade when the term national security came to be used interchangeably with international security (Baldwin, 1996:124).

Even though Helga Haftendorn, in her presidential address delivered to the 31st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in April of 1990 (Haftendorn, 1991:35), proposed the concepts of national security, international security and global security as distinct notions, based on different philosophical traditions, the follow up to her appeal did not develop the study of international security as a distinct concept, separated from the one of national security.

3- Collective Security.

For almost fifty years, the notion of collective security has been put under siege by realism. If the notion of international security implies, as Michael Howard has said, a common interest in security transcending the particular interests of sovereign states, the recognition of that common interest carries with it the aspiration to create a communal framework to replace the need for unilateral national security measures (Howard, 1996:63-80), and contradicts the tenets of the anarchical world advocated by realism. Collective security must be understood as the system created and agreed upon by the United Nations’ members to support the international security concept that was agreed at San Francisco. Therefore, there is not one sole dichotomy, as several have posited, national security versus collective security; but two dichotomies: national security versus international security, and balance of power versus collective security. The first dichotomy is the one already explained in this chapter. The second dichotomy is the one that I now look to clarify.

Collective security seems to have a double meaning. The first is the one related to the system of security established in the Charter of the United Nations: the Security Council as the organ entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security with three tools: peaceful settlement of disputes, sanctions and enforcement action; additionally, the General Assembly and the international Court of Justice must be also considered. The second meaning is the one related to a fundamental principle that is the bedrock of the system of collective security, the principle of concern: an attack against one member is an attack against
all - war against a sovereign state is a threat to the peace of all states, including those that are not parties to the conflict -.

Thus, when the notion of national security was posited against the concept of a collective security system, a translocation took place. In essence, this translocation resulted in a fictitious debate because the concept of national security could not be compared to a system of collective security. In the records of the Seventh and Eight International Studies Conferences held in 1934 and 1935 in Paris and London, we certainly find that collective security is believed to be best defined by comparison with other systems that search for security: "History reveals that nations or empires have sought security in three ways, by domination, by a system of balance, and by collective arrangements" (Bourquin, 1935:132). Furthermore, it is added that:

The balance of power system relies on secret diplomacy and pressure, it ignores small nations; the collective system emphasizes the use of open discussion and, more than anything, provides the machinery of arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement (Bourquin, 1935).

However, in the same Seventh and Eight International Studies Conferences held in 1934 and 1935 in Paris, the closest they got to elaborate on collective security as a shared notion of security among states was "freedom from insecurity" of the "universal collectivity of mankind" (Bourquin, 1935) or to understand security as juridical security: "[...] a condition in which a State that observes the objective law needs not fear that its rights as a subject of international law will be violated without redress (Bourquin, 1935). These short developments were natural; it would take ten more years to bring about the UN Charter. It can be said that since then the term "collective security" has been used in two meanings: first, it means a system for establishing international security and peace; and second, it means a very basic concept of international security.

The failure of the League of Nations and the onset of the Second World War would change perspectives and endeavors. In accordance with Brian C. Schmidt, as the League of Nations was unable to cope with crisis in the early 1930s, scholars changed their attention from the study of international organization to international politics meaning by the latter the intractable problems of anarchy (Schmidt, 1998:209).

Therefore, the system of collective security has been frequently confused with the concept of international security. Furthermore, taking into consideration the weakness of the collective security system and its confusion with the concept of international security, after the Second World War the very strong realist perspective inclined the debate on security towards the national security concept.

Even though in Politics Among Nations Hans J. Morgenthau stated that collective security was the most far-reaching attempt to overcome the deficiencies of a "completely decentralized system of law enforcement," he considered that the logic of collective security had flaws, because in the light of historic experience and the nature of international politics no nation or combination of nations can afford to oppose aggression at all times. Collective security is in this way in contradiction with the substantial nature of international politics. This approach towards collective security was going to be expanded during the fifties and the sixties. Inis L. Claude Jr. in his book, Swords into Plowshares published in 1956, specified the elements and delineated the characteristics of the system of collective security. Later, in 1962, in Power and International Relations, Inis Claude would expand his perspective on collective security:
"states are not prepared to, or convinced that they should do, the things that an operative system of collective security would require them to do" (Claude, 1962:204).

The judgment on collective security by Roland N. Stromberg is by no means a positive one. In his article "The Idea of collective Security" published in 1956, Roland N. Stromberg considered that collective security not only introduced confusion in the field of international relations, but also did something to damage world's affairs (Stromberg, 1956:250-63). Kenneth W. Thompson was less fault finding than Stromberg; however, in recognizing the limits of collective security he advocated an empirical and pragmatic approach to this notion (Thompson, 1953:753-72). Arnold Wolfers, for his part, in a down-to-earth analysis of US interests and the system of collective security, opened a path to consider the latter as an instrument of the first one (Wolfers, 1954:492-96).

The disenchanted approach towards collective security came also to permeate the academic investigation of the 1970s and 1980s, when authors such as Ernst B. Haas, Stanley Michalak, Mark W. Zacher and Joel Larus tried to explain the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security through the very tools of realism: balance of power, alliances, concert of powers, among others. Based on the foundation that the international system was composed of self-interested states, their intention was to understand the place of the United Nations and its impact. Stanley Michalak produced in 1971 a study which had the purpose of studying the relationships between the League of Nations and the United Nations and the systemic context within which they operated (Michalak, 1974). Mark W. Zacher wrote in 1979 a study not only on the United Nations, but also on several regional organizations which linked organizational intervention and success in conflicts to the character of the international system (Zacher, 1979). Ernst B. Haas published in 1986 a study whose intention was to measure the degree of success of the United Nations' efforts in disputes (Haas, 1986). The eighties were for the realist strand of thought a confirmation of the deep seeded roots of international conflict, and once again of the quite marginal place of collective security.

Even though Helga Haftendorn's appeal to study international security as a distinct concept was not successful, the end of the Cold War certainly brought about, on the one hand, a renewed interest on the concept of collective security. Authors such as Thomas G. Weiss, Charles A. Kupchan, Joseph Lepgold and Charles Lipson once again put on the table the debate on collective security. The results of their endeavours are mixed. The concept of collective security has once again confronted the early realist criticisms. In Collective Security Beyond the Cold War, it is the intention to find a balance between those that, in the words of George W. Downs, refuse to abandon the politics of the Cold War and the others that support the ideal of collective security, and in this sense to overcome a debate that eighty years later little has changed (Downs, 1994). Among the authors who contributed to this book are Charles A. Kupchan and Stephen M. Walt; the first represents the supporters of the collective security idea, and, the latter represents the strong realist criticism of this notion. However, the attempt to bring once again the notion of collective security into the scholarly discussion had a turn. Two books, one edited and the other co-edited by Thomas G. Weiss have not only reinvigorated the discussions on collective security, but have also opened a new avenue of interest in favour of the multilateral management of conflicts (Weis, 1998). Collective Security in a Changing World, published in 1993, was an effort to put once again on the scholarly agenda the debate on collective security. Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics, edited in 1998, instead of focusing on the theoretical debate on collective security, expanded its scope in...
order to underline the possibilities of managing international conflict. The first article of the book, authored by Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss was dedicated to the issue of "collective conflict management."

In that context it can be said that the renewed interest in collective security came once again to the fore in reason of the renewed activism of the Security Council of the United Nations and the increase in the activities of the organization in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, the treatment collective security received was not very much conceptually different from the treatment realism has devoted to it for fifty years.

4- Security in the 1980s.

Apart from the debates on national security and on collective security, there are proposals on common security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. The resurgence of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear confrontation in the 1980s brought about a new strand of thought that assumed, first, that international security was not only possible but also needed. There was a rejection of a notion of security based on the nuclear balance of terror. Common security was seen not only as an aspiration but also as a need. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues: Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (Simon and Schuster, 1982), published in 1982, was the word of the day with its aspiration for arms limitation and disarmament. The analysis of common security by Bjørn Miller identifies this concept under the premises of realism, though within an enlightened rationality: states pursue national interests, the security dilemma should be overcome through disarmament; interdependence modifies the framework conditions of the quest for security, and states have to take into account the security concerns of other states (Miller, 1992). The concept of common security acquired political pre-eminence in the political security discourse of the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe, particularly in the SPD of West Germany. Although the use of common security has suffered a lack of discipline, efforts such as those of Raimo Väyrynen (Väyrynen, 1985), and Radmilla Nakarada and Jan Oberg (Oberg and Nakarada, 1988) under the aegis of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research, have taken place. Cooperative Security and comprehensive security have also arisen as other two notions that search for a new alternative to deterrence. An effort in the United States, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation, the Brookings Institution, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Harvard and Stanford universities, has been developed in order to deepen the understanding of cooperative security. The result of these efforts has been A New Concept of Cooperative Security (1992) by Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner (Carter and others, 1992), and Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (1994) by Janne E. Noland (Noland, 1994). It can be said, however, that the notion of cooperative security resembles very much to the concept of common security, for it is understood as designed to ensure that organized aggression could not start on any large scale.

5- Intervention and Security

Of all the endeavors that in recent years have characterized scholarly work on the area of the maintenance of international peace and security, one is of particular interest for the purposes of this literature review, the one on intervention and state sovereignty, because it puts on the table the assault against two principles upon which the system of collective security was built in 1945. In San Francisco the object and subject of the UN was the state; international peace meant peace among sovereign states. However, in the context of the end of the Cold War,
recent events and actions taken in accordance with the UN Security Council have opened a debate in which the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention have been the object of profound challenges. Internal conflicts, now deprived of the Cold War’s ideological framework, became the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s that would challenge the triumph of democracy and free markets. The devastation and tremendous suffering of internal struggles became the motive of concern and brought up the resurgence of ethical questions concerning the right to intervene.

Of particular interest has been the presence of non-governmental organizations linked to humanitarian relief assistance. In 1987 a group of French jurists and voluntary agencies started to press for a droit d’ingerence in international law. They proposed the idea in a conference cosponsored by Medecins du Monde at the Universite de Paris-Sud, with President Francois Mitterrand in the audience. In the same year, Bernard Kouchner and Mario Bettati, the former founder of Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), and the latter a distinguished legal scholar, coauthored Le devoir d’ingerence (The Duty to Intervene). Bettati and Kouchner argued in favor of supporting war victims’ right to international intervention in order to alleviate their suffering, without the consent of the state recipient of the assistance (Bettati and Kouchner, 1987). Kouchner was later appointed Minister of State for Humanitarian Action and later on Minister of Public Health and Humanitarian Action, in the French cabinet. Bettati became legal adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the concern for humanitarian emergencies grew after the frustration to prevent another famine in Ethiopia in 1989-1991, and the refusal of Sudan in 1990 even to admit the existence of a famine.

Normative claims about the right of people to be safe from threats whatever their source, have challenged the notion of state sovereignty (Judith, 1989 and the notion of just war has received a renewed attention. The work of Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars,(Waltzer, 1977) first published in 1977, has made a comeback from the shelves and has been given an attention that it did not generate almost thirty years ago. The proportionality of means and ends, core idea in Walzer's work, however, has not elicited major interest. Therefore, his very important contribution has mainly been acknowledged as a contribution to the language of the just-war theory.

Political and scholarly interest in the use of force, and particularly on intervention, is not new. However, the profound changes that the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about set the debate on a different footing. In the United States, the successful record of interventions during the 1980 (Granada 1983, Lebanon 1983, Nicaragua 1984 and the bombing of Libya 1986) unleashed a process of reflection regarding the relation between intervention and respect for international law. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored during these years a number of meetings and publications dealing with the issue. In 1984, the Council convened a study group on “International Law and the Use of Force” under the chairmanship of William D. Rogers, former under-secretary of state, which finished its work in 1988 (Rogers and others, 1989). The results of this study group, however, did not leave behind the traditional debate on UN Charter law and unilateral intervention.

With Gorbachev in power in the Soviet Union, a process of relaxation of relations with the United States appeared to make irrelevant the confrontational Reagan policy. However, the invasion of Panama in 1989 and the possibility of a Russian reassessment upon national and subnational groups, added more elements to the already complex debate on intervention. On October 4-6, 1990, a joint US—Soviet Conference on International Law and the Non-Use of
Force was convened in Washington. Leading authorities in international law in the United States and the Soviet Union participated. Several of the contributions of the Conference were compiled in *Law and Force in the New International Order* (Fisler and Scheffer, 1991). Part III of this compilation addresses the issue of intervention in four forms: by invitation, against illegitimate regimes, for humanitarian purposes and against criminal activity, such as terrorism and drug trafficking. Humanitarian intervention has been without a doubt the one that has deserved until now the most attention; however, there is a thin line dividing permissive and non-permissive intervention.

The literature on intervention of recent years has been mainly divided among, first, those that favor the use of force in order to achieve objectives that are considered of universal value and that in their opinion transcend self-serving national interests, and, second, those that are deeply suspicious of actions, particularly the use of force, to obtain goals that are not clearly defined. Between those extremes, thirdly, some prefer to consider the issue of intervention in light of its effectiveness in short and long terms.

First, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse are examples of strong advocates of the principles of humanitarian intervention which they consider represent a general consensus among not only those that are in favour of humanitarian intervention, but also among those that oppose such intervention (Oliver and Woodhouse, 1996:226). For Lori Fisler Damrosch, a "normative consensus" is in the process of emerging, or has already emerged in part, regarding the condition under which the international involvement in an internal crisis is justified. Furthermore, large segments of the international community have been willing to endorse strong collective action in a wide range of situations such as: genocide, interference with the delivery of humanitarian assistance, violations of cease-fire agreements, collapse of civil order, and irregular interruption of democratic governance (Fisler, 1993:11-13). Thomas G. Weiss has also advocated intervention not only as a need, but also as more feasible than at any time since the founding of the United Nations (Weis, 1993:31-32). John Paul II has also favored a strong instance on humanitarian intervention:

[...] we must by all means ensure aid, whether alimentary or sanitary, and lift all obstacles including those which arise from arbitrary recourse to the principle of non-interference in a country's domestic affairs (Coste, 1993:28).

The issue of intervention to restore democratic governments has taken a step forward with Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney. In their opinion, the aim must now be not only that of creating mechanisms to respond to global interruptions of constitutional democracy, but also one to protect it with additional measures, such as making the stealing of democratic elections a personal responsibility (Halperin and Lomansney, 1999:11-15).

Secondly, other authors have concerns about intervention. Adam Roberts considers that the result of the operations in northern Iraq, Somalia and Yugoslavia have exposed fundamental flaws in the impulse and practice of humanitarian intervention, because this term implies that intervention in another state can be humanitarian in five respects: in its origins, in its motives, in its stated purposes, in its methods of operation and in its actual results.

Furthermore, unilateral intervention without the blessing of the UN Security Council will risk competitive chaos, insecurity and the pursuit of unilateral advantage, for there is
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Richard Falk, for his part, analyses the intervention in Haiti as a case in which the 'right to democratic governance' was put to a test, and remains pessimistic about its future, because, in his opinion, the concept of a virtuous intervention arises from the underlying conviction that the self-interest of powerful states is served by the extension of political democracy to as many countries as possible (Falk, 1995:351-58). The new interventionism is, for Richard Falk, not new and does not transcend the self-serving interest of the powerful countries.

Neta Crawford, after analyzing decolonization as an international norm, concludes that in the absence of equality and respect among states, moral arguments can be, and often are, used paternalistically, and there is danger that a notion of justified intervention will be paternalistic in the absence of the involvement of those who are the subject of intervention (Crawford, 1993).

Third, Ernst B. Haas and Stanley Hoffman are example of those who are advocating a merge of the ethical concerns and the hard issues of 'national security.' They are looking for a middle ground between the ethics of total application and the pragmatic needs of those that have the power to intervene. In "Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes towards the Definition of Justifiable Intervention"(Haas, 1993:63-87), Ernst B. Haas argued that the choice between intervening or not cannot be made on legal, normative and practical grounds, because intervention has not an agreed and accepted meaning. The choice should rather be made in order to assure the legitimacy of future international coercion on behalf of moral commitments, in which the final criterion of choice is effectiveness. Even though he considers cases under which intervention should be possible, the main basis upon which a decision to intervene should be taken is when the objectives are achievable. Stanley Hoffman, for his part, argues that military intervention is ethically justified when domestic turmoil threatens regional or international security and when massive violations of human rights occur. In his opinion, the concept of 'national interest' should be widened to incorporate ethical concerns. The issue of justified intervention comes to be, in Stanley Hoffman's eyes, one in which unilateral intervention, under certain conditions, is possible (Hoffman, 1996:29-51).

The very close linkage between sovereignty and non-intervention guarantees that changes in the meaning of sovereignty will produce changes in the understanding of non-intervention (Hehir, 1995:3). If there is a redefinition of international security in the UN Security Council, taking into account the recent tasks with which the organization has taken upon itself, the debate on intervention and sovereignty is certainly very much on the ground. A new notion of international security will imply a re-definition of core principles that lie at the heart of the system that was built in San Francisco. The current debate on intervention is very much related to the scope that international security is supposed to have

Concluding remarks

There are several elements that result from this analysis: a) the conceptual debate has taken place on the issue of national security, for in an anarchical system of self-help there is no other security possible than the one provided by the state itself; b) the notion of international security has not been given a great deal of attention, even though it is frequently used; c) when the term international security is used, it lacks a precise meaning; d) the term collective security has been used with two different meanings: as a system of collective security, and as a notion of
international security; e) those two meanings have been deeply criticized; and f) the broad and deep debate that took place during the 1990s on issues such as humanitarian intervention, minority rights, human rights, sovereignty, self-determination and democratic governance.

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