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PROBLEMS OF MODERN IRANIAN FAMILIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL-PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

Abstract

It is the true that the family is the social and real system and has belonging to features. In such system, individuals, is closed by strong and emotional or mental connections two-sided and for a long time. Family, as an institute, together with religion and politics, has always been a building block of Iranian society. In addition, we observe the diminishing in the strength of these connections it is durable in height of life in the inside of time in families. There are many conflicts in the families. The conflict between the parents is considered from the basic problems of the world. It is one of the most basic problems of these conflicts being between parents. It is the possible to say that if it observes conflicts between parents of all children in fewer degrees, they need a peace, and they accept as like piece of the life. Even considering the institutional development in Iran since the beginning of the 20th century, the three mentioned institutions have always shaped Iranian society structure and social relationships.

Key words: Modern Iranian families, modern Iran society, social family problems.

SOSYAL FELSEFI BAKIŞ ACISINDAN MODERN IRAN AILELERİNİN SORUNLARI

Özet

Bu bir gerçekдетir ki, aile, sosyal ve gerçek bir sistem olarak kendine has özelliklere sahiptir. Böyle bir sistemde, bireylerin güçlü ve duygusal veya zihinsel bağlantıları iki tarafı ve uzun bir süre için ilişkileri ortaya çıkmaktadır. Aile, bir kurum olarak, din ve siyasetle birlikte her zaman İran toplumunun bir yapı taşı olmuştur. Aile kavgaları insan fertlerinde görülen davranışlar olarak yukarıda belirttiğimiz doğru eğitim metodu, toplumun alışık olduğu sosyal davranışlar

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biçimi, topluma dışarıdan yaptırılan yeni sosyal sistemlerin varlığına orantızı, adeti üzere onlara yabancı olan veya anormal formada kabul edilen, asi ruhlu davranışlar bütününden kaynaklanıyor. Ebeveynler arasında çatışma dünyanın temel sorunlarından biridir. Bu çatışmaların en temel zor olanı da çatışmada ebeveynler arasında kalmaktır. Şöyle söylemek mümkündür ki, az oranda bile olsa, ebeveynler arasında çıkan çatışmalarda ayrırmak zorunda kalan ve barışa muhtaç çocuklar da vardır ve onlar bu nedenle bir parçası olarak kabullenmektedir. Hatta İran'da 20. yüzyılın başlarından bu yana, dikkate alınan kurumsal gelişim olarak üç belirtilen Enstitüt İran toplum yapısını ve sosyal ilişkiler. şekillendirmektedir

Anahtar kelimeler: Çağdaş İran aileleri, çağdaş İran toplumu, sosyal ai sorunları.

1. Introduction

Despite constant efforts and urgent attempts to overcome these global problems the best we have are only some moderate results. Important decisions have not been made and important actions have not been taken. Serious reasons exist to think we are proceeding in the wrong direction in trying to find solutions. Our efforts aim to influence effects, not causes. As a result, we disclose new unintended problems even as we overcome some difficulties. And like a person trying to remove weeds by their leaves without removing their roots we go on wondering why the weeds continue to grow thicker and richer. Therefore, to seek the roots of our global problems one should first attempt an active beginning. This beginning should start with the human condition including relations with others and the environment.

We humans find ourselves in a particularly precarious situation as we enter the new millennium, in which values other than those, which respect, nurture, and protect the Human Beings of the planet Earth. They are being promoted and foisted upon us in ways. They are devastating to our fragile life support system and to Human safety, and to the Human spirit.

We have all of the necessary elements for creating a peaceful, safe and nurturing environment for all of the peoples of this Earth. We have intelligence, yet we lack wisdom. We have science and technology, yet much scientific endeavor is dedicated to destruction and weapons, rather than benefiting humankind. Medical marvels are inequitably distributed. We understand Human development and the needs for nutrition and healthful living conditions, yet children the world over are starving by the thousands.

We know enough about psychology to recognize the roots of hatreds and fears, yet groups of us continue to find ourselves manipulated into the dangerous and outdated “we or they” manner of thinking, rather than considering our completely Human family, and acknowledging that we are more alike than we are different. We understand and even sign declarations agreeing that there are universal Human Rights and inherent freedoms, yet somehow the manifestation of power and moneyed interests, and the age-old reversion to militarism as a method of problem solving continue to defy all logic and prevent us Humans from creating the peaceful world we dream of and long for.

If the heads of corporations and governments, financial and military institutions, and other vested interests that have such a profound impact on Human well being, would take
responsibility and consider the consequences of their decisions in terms of their own personal loved ones being affected by conscienceless actions taken, such as bombing, polluting, exploiting, and placing more value on profits than on people, then we would begin to see a moral awakening.

We all have values instilled in us by our upbringing and our life's experiences; we have many different belief systems many different ethnic, racial and religious tradition; but the values which most of us share are those of safety and happiness for our loved ones and ourselves. If these personal values became the criteria by which we evaluate our Human well-being and became the primary focus of Human activity, putting aside short-term self-centered gains, as well as rethinking old enmities and fears, there might be a happier future for all of Humankind.

2. Discussions

An attractive feature of demographic work is the relative ease of some key measurements. For instance, substantial agreement can and has been reached on the measurement of births and deaths, events anchored in biology. Certainly compared with many other social science concepts, these events are well measured and have similar meanings across time and space [see Morgan and Lynch 2001]. The timing of first birth, for instance, usually corresponds with the transition to parenthood and is a major event biologically and socially. Here we will focus on first pregnancy that is nine months removed from first birth for most women. Marriage on the other hand has a less certain meaning. Across contexts, it may or may not signal the beginning of intercourse, spousal co-residence, an attempt to establish a close emotional bond, an attempt to institutionalize a familial division of labor, etc. The distinction made here between the “fixed” meaning of the first birth [or pregnancy] and marriage is a relative one. Our claim [Rindfuss and Morgan 1983] is that we can use the timing and sequencing of first birth and marriage as a way of indexing marriage and gender change, since the meaning of first birth is relatively fixed.

For instance, Rindfuss and Morgan [1983] document shortening first birth intervals [i.e., shorter durations between marriage and first birth] in a number of Asian contexts. While they consider a range of possible explanations, they conclude that the shortening of the first birth interval was the result of increasing coital frequency early in marriage. The more frequent coitus, in turn, reflected a shift in marriage from arranged marriages to ones with substantial input from the partners. Rindfuss and Morgan argued that greater familiarity, initial closeness and physical attraction associated with “love matches” was conducive to coitus that is more frequent.

This empirical finding has been replicated and its interpretation often adopted [Wang and Quanhe 1996]. In fact, we will document a similar phenomenon for Iranians married between 1970 and 1990 and for the full range of marriage cohorts we examine [1970-2000] if those using birth control are excluded.

2 For those whose first conception failed to produce a live birth the event is also likely well remembered as a crisis early in married life.

3 Rindfuss and Morgan show that the increase that could have this effect is from very low levels [0-2 times per month] to levels closer to “normal” [8-12 times per month].
Note that the shortening of the first birth interval as described by Rindfuss and Morgan was still within a view of marriage as primarily a context for parenthood. In short, marriage was postponed until the couple was ready to become parents. In the Asian contexts studied by Rindfuss and Morgan [Taiwan, Malaysia, and Korea] and Wang and Quanhe [China], initially there was little contraceptive use in the first birth interval despite its use at higher parities in all of these contexts. In contrast, birth control use immediately after marriage is becoming common in Iran, especially among the most educated. How do we understand this new phenomenon? Is it best understood as signaling change -- an emerging feminist ideology and companionate marriage? Or is the use of birth control allowing for maintenance of an early marriage regime consistent with Iranian-Islamist ideology?

Our empirical focus is on a small component of family and fertility change, the length of the interval between marriage and first pregnancy. This focus is not driven by the importance of this change in accounting for the dramatic fertility decline noted above-- in this respect; the lengthening of the period to first pregnancy is trivial [see Hosseini-Chavoshi, McDonald and Abbasi-Shavazi, Forthcoming]. Rather we concentrate on the first pregnancy interval because of its substantive importance as a possible marker of the changing nature of marriage and gender relations. Alternatively, the changes we document may reflect an attempt to maintain the status quo in the face of exigencies encouraging marriage and fertility delay.

More generally, we contrast two broad theoretical interpretations. First, a widely-used theoretical model posits a shift in family structure from arranged to companionate marriage driven by industrialization and western ideology [e.g., Goode 1963; also see Thornton 2001; 2005]. This fundamental shift in the basis for marriage would, in turn, predict the observed changes in the first pregnancy interval. Alternatively, the changes we document could reflect an attempt to maintain the status quo in the face of exigencies encouraging marriage and fertility delay. In developing both these explanations we borrow from Sewell [1992;2005] [as elaborated by Johnson-Hanks et al [2006]] a “duality of structure” approach that emphasizes the interactions of schemas, such as taken-for-granted interpretations of marriage and gender, and resources, such as modern contraception and the power of economic, political and religious institutions Below we explain our interest in the first birth interval and then develop competing explanations that can account for recent large increases in birth control use between marriage and the first birth. This exercise provides a window into family and gender in

This conceptualization has a number of advantages [Johnson-Hanks et.al. 2006:3]. Most relevant to this research is its move beyond interpretations of change driven by “ideology” or “material” changes to an examination of their interaction; this perspective also shows how individual decisions can accumulate to reify structure or to produce structural change. In short, actors confront new exigencies with available schemas and the resources for employing them. At the margin, actors can be innovative because new exigencies entail uncertainty regarding appropriate behavior and because new resources may make new [old] behaviors plausible [problematic].

We are interested in how Iranian couples and society respond to the contemporary, internationally pervasive exigencies posed by economic development and globalization, i.e., a high premium on human capital formation, an expanding range of consumer items, and low economic security. Two other pervasive contextual components are Western ideas promoting egalitarian marriages and the availability of highly effective birth control. Many studies have
applied the life course framework to show how individuals respond to more training/schooling, higher aspirations, and insecurity [see Blossfeld 2005; Thornton and Lin 1994]. Young men and women do not eschew marriage and parenthood; they postpone it. Cross nationally, the postponement of parenthood is a ubiquitous response to these factors. But how is this postponement realized? Given effective contraception, the logical possibilities include: frequent no marital unions and relationships but postponement of marriage and childbearing [e.g., Scandinavia, Northern Europe and the U.S. see Bumpass, Sweet and Cherlin 1991]; abstinence and postponement of both marriage and childbearing [e.g., Southern Europe, much of Asia and in Iran]; or early marriage and birth control within marriage [e.g., an emerging pattern we observe in Iran]. Each strategy postpones parenthood and thus facilitates other investments and activities. How do we explain the Iranian proclivity for the latter two, especially the last?

A first explanation, the conjugal or Western marriage argument, offers an answer and is consistent with Sewell’s [1992, 2005] broad [“duality of structure”] framework. The conjugal family argument also has appeal based on longstanding theoretical and empirical claims of global convergence in family forms. Specifically, Goode [1963] argued that Western ideologies supporting free mate choice and egalitarianism [western family schemas] were overwhelmingly attractive to nonwestern indigenous young people. Further, if accompanied by economic development and non-familial employment [that shifted control of key resources to young adults], industrialization allowed the freedom from elders necessary for young people to act on the basis of this new schema – to choose one’s partner, to marry for love, and to build couple centered egalitarian relationships. The global march of industrialization and the ideology that accompanied it were powerful agents of family change. Goode argued they would produce a global, isomorphic conjugal family form. This conjugal marriage explanation has appeal. It acknowledges the duality of schemas and resources [western schemas and new resources emanating from no familial labor]. It has grand scope. In addition, much empirical change is consistent with it, e.g, in Iran fertility is declining, age at marriage is rising, free mate choice is becoming more common and nuclear residence is frequent in urban areas [see Ladier-Fouladi 2000]. In addition, most to the point for purposes here, contraceptive use before the first birth is increasing. Further, the conjugal marriage legitimates partnerships for companionship and intimacy net of and distinct from parenthood. Thus increasing contraceptive use could be viewed as part of this conjugal family “package”.

Also consistent with the Sewell conceptual approach, are path dependent explanations that stress cultural and historical continuity and the importance of historical events. Given the tumultuous history of Iran in the period of study, consideration of these special circumstances seems wise. McDonald [1994] posits that a fundamental structural component of all societies is an idealized family morality, i.e, “deep”, “foundational” schemas supported by considerable resources [Johnson-Hanks 2006; also see Sewell 1992]. Because family structure is central to biological and social replacement [functional prerequisites to group survival], this morality is fundamental to societal and individual identity. Domesticity and motherhood are the core components of Iranian women’s traditional family schemas. The lynchpins [i.e. resources key to its maintenance] are a sharp gendered division of labor and clear gender stratification. Early marriage is seen, probably correctly so, as a key behavior for maintaining both. Consistent with these claims, only a small percentage of Iranian women worked outside the home after the Revolution [approximately 7% of women], twice this percentage were employed prior to the Revolution [Mehryar and Tajdini 1998]. The susceptibility of traditional behavior to change will
vary with the availability of alternative schema, the resources available for the enactment of each, and the actors’ assessment of the best course of action. A key factor is the extent to which deviation from the idealized morality is tolerated. In particular, McDonald [1994; also see Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald, forthcoming] argues that there is little variation from the idealized family morality in countries where the family system is reinforced by a strong social morality, that is, where “variation from the ideal is deemed to be illegal, antisocial, or contrary to the teachings of the prevailing religion”. In such countries, the dominant family schemas are policed by the strong formal institutions of the society, principally the institutions of religion and the state. In Sewell’s [1992; 2005] terms, traditional schemas are supported by strong institutional resources.

Wright [2000], in the Last Great Revolution, describes the Republic’s early years of turmoil and the rejection of nearly everything Western. Appropriate Islamic public dress and appearance were codified and these rules strictly enforced; gender segregation was pervasive in public places; and domestic roles of women were glorified. Early marriage and motherhood were encouraged. Legal marriage ages were lowered to 13 and 15 [from 15 and 18] for females and males, respectively. Family planning was labeled an imperialist plot to reduce the number of Muslims [Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000]. Many family planning clinics were closed and clinic personnel transferred to other jobs [Aghajanian 1991:712]. Fertility increased after the Revolution due to these changes and other pronatalist policies [some possibly traceable to the Iran-Iraq War. See Abbasi-Shavazi et. al. 2002]. In fact, in the decade, following the Revolution Iran had the fastest population growth rate in the world [nearly 4% per year, see Aghajanian 1991; Mirzaie 1998], driven primarily by total fertility rates of more than six births per woman. By the late 1980s the excesses of the Revolution were colliding with the realities of governing an oil rich country of nearly 60 million people [See Wright 2000:160-165]. The year, 1986, constituted something of a watershed in the demographic history of Iran. In that year, the oil price plummeted greatly reducing the revenues of the government, the war with Iraq was in its sixth year with no sign of resolution and the Islamic Republic’s first census revealed the massive growth of population and the high fertility rates that characterized the first years of the revolution. For six years, the populace had experienced unmet economic aspirations now coupled with falling oil prices, and a broad sense that worsening circumstances were likely. For a country that had always struggled in finding work for its burgeoning numbers of young people, the future challenge seemed immense. Over the next few years a series of meetings were held in this crisis environment. Hoodfar and Assadpour [2000] describe how policy makers and intellectuals lobbied religious leaders on the “population crisis”

The religious authorities saw as their first and primary task to dispel the myth that the population debate originated in modern Western society. Reviewing debates on the permissibility of fertility control and sponsoring research and republication of medieval Islamic works on population and contraception, they established that concern about population had

4 Also see Abbasi-Shavazi et. al. 2002 for a more detailed discussion. Two government departments are known to have played a major role in the initiation of the family planning debate and in keeping it alive: the Ministry of Health and the Plan and Budget Organization. The first had been responsible for the family planning program prior to the Revolution and had remained deeply committed to the health implications of contraceptive access.
Problems of Modern Iranian Families In The Context of Social -Philosophical Review

prooccupied Muslim scholars long before it was discussed in the West. Thus, the authorities were able to celebrate Iran’s Islamic heritage, to promote family planning, and to reinforce their independence from the West [Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 28].

Once fit within an Islamic schema, major clerics endorsed family planning. In fact, having only the children that one can care for is now interpreted consistently as an obligation of good Muslim mothers and fathers. Religious leaders took an active role in relaying the message. Government funded family planning clinics quickly re-emerged. Analogous to China’s ‘barefoot doctors’, thousands of women from around the country were recruited and lightly trained as medical professionals [Mehryar and Ahmad-Nia 2005]. Afterward they returned to home villages with the message and materials needed for effective family planning. The result of all of these changes was the dramatic decline in the total fertility rate. [see Abbasi-Shavazi 2000, 2001, 2002; Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2005]. Post-revolutionary gender liberalization has been far more uneven. On the one hand, highly visible reforms included such changes as separation of the sexes in schools and public places, and the enforcement of a strict dress code. The Islamic view is that women are different from, but not inferior to, men. Nevertheless, male or female differences [in reproduction and parenthood] necessitate different rights and obligations. Thus, a gendered division of labor and gender stratification remains fundamental pillars of gendered behavior in contemporary Iran. Using Aghajanian’s [1991:712] understated description: …the roles and status of women were more narrowly circumscribed in the context of the new Islamic Republic. Religious and political leaders suggested that the dignity of women would be best attained if they were restored to domestic areas and to raising generations of good Muslims. Legal and social changes were introduced and enforced to perpetuate the traditional role of women and to remove all influences deriving from policies of Westernization. On the other hand and contrary to Western stereotypes, an egalitarian spirit prevailed in the streets during the period of the revolution. Males and females alike joined in the demonstrations, marches and strikes that culminated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This visible participation of women presented a new image of females, and women themselves recognized their strength in numbers [Touba 1985:131]. More concretely, the egalitarian nature of the revolution extended to women full access to education and health services. Iranian girls and women remain in schools and universities for more years than in the past. University enrollment has shifted in favor of girls. In 1998, 52 per cent of government university admits were girls.

This figure increased to 57 per cent in 1999, to 60 percent in 2000, and to 62 percent in 2001 [Abdollahyan, 2004]. The state’s willingness to tolerate some change in order to maintain early marriage is illustrated by contemporary marriage requirements and incentives. For instance, beginning in the early 1990s, before couples could obtain a marriage certificate they were required to attend a family counseling class. These classes provide explicit information about human reproduction and about specific methods of birth control. Couples are encouraged to plan both the timing and number of their births. In addition, engaged couples are provided with a “starter sample” of a recommended contraceptive method. The enactment of this policy provides a concrete example of an important event; one that offers both new schemas and resources for implementing new behavior.

The government also provided direct incentives to marry and targeted the more educated women. Various government organizations [e.g., the Youth Organization] have indicated the importance of providing incentives including financial support for young men and women to marry. The Office of Supreme Leader at universities across Iran have initiated
programs that encourage students [men and women] in their universities’ to marry. For instance at Tehran University in recent years, the Office of Supreme Leader organized public ceremonies on religious occasions to acknowledge students who married other student in the university. The couples were presented with gold coins [worth approximately 170 US$] by the government and other community donors provided basic amenities to the couples, items such as a refrigerator, carpet etc. Many other universities have similar ceremonies. As another example, in 2003, the mayor of Tehran [and now the Iranian President, Dr. Mohmoud Ahmadinejad] proposed loans and housing allowances for newly married couples. Interestingly, the 2005 elected government in its first meeting held in the city of Mashhad in 26 August 2005, established a foundation to provide loans in the name of the eighth Shiite Imam, Sandoogh-e Mehr-e Imam Reza, to support young adult employment and marriage.

Thus in the Iranian context, it is reasonable to interpret increasing birth control use after marriage as a response to existing exigencies and new resources and not as reflecting Western-style change in the nature of Iranian marriage. We stress two aspects of this Iranian social history [i.e., structural change]. First, its constituent events can be accounted for in retrospect but could not have been well predicted in advance. Thus, this history captures both the unpredictability and path dependence of structural change [Sewell 2005; also see Lieberson and Lynn 2002]. Second, understanding the behavior of individuals on the ground requires acknowledgement of these distinctive structures [schema/resources]. Specifically, in the Iranian circumstance, family change must be interpreted within a framework that accommodates institutional sanctions: how much and what type of family change will be acceptable to the ruling authorities. Individuals can experiment with the boundaries of change and find that in some areas that these boundaries are relatively flexible. Change in these domains will be realized, while in others, the boundaries are rigid and innovative behavior is strongly punished, formally and/or The Foundation was to operate in all provinces. However, the initiative has not yet been approved by the Parliament due to fiscal constraints. In contemporary Iran, religious authorities define and interpret the boundaries of acceptable behavior. Change may proceed in some aspects of family life because that change is not viewed as a threat to the idealized family morality. For example, birth control use and smaller family size are acceptable [and after 1990 encouraged,] while “dating”, premarital sex and cohabitation are anathema [see Wright 2000].

Specifically, our data allow for a key test involving women’s education and aspects of the conjugal “marriage package”, i.e., egalitarian views, freedom of movement, etc. Consistent with the conjugal marriage interpretation, it is plausible that education signals exposure to new ideas [schemas] including those supportive of conjugal marriage and egalitarian marital relations. In fact, increased education is associated with egalitarian attitudes in the West [Mason 1976] and, according to recent survey data, in Iran [Kurzman 2005]. Further, education is associated with more liberal attitudes and measures of freedom of movement that are available in the data we use here [items discussed later in this paper]. Thus, education effects could reflect an emerging feminist ideology [i.e., a new schema] supportive of conjugal marriage; these ideas and greater freedom of movement could then be the proximate cause of birth control use. This explanation predicts that education effects will be sharply attenuated or eliminated once egalitarian attitudes, indicative of new marriage schemas, are included in the multivariate model. One might be skeptical of this explanation for Iran because the resources and institutional support for the conjugal marriage regime seem weak given the power of Islamic religious and political institutions.
Alternatively, in the competing perspective, the more educated may use birth control to sustain early marriage or more precisely to marry in accordance with traditional Islamic schema while still postponing parenthood. This direct education effect indicates that the costs of early marriage are reduced if marriage does not imply immediate parenthood. Postponement of parenthood allows the couple and their families more time to establish an economic basis for marriage, including the completion of schooling, obtaining a job, and establishing a residence.

Each of these goals is more demanding and time consuming for higher status, more educated couples. Further, delayed parenthood allows the couple to mature so that they will be more ready to become good parents. Note that none of these arguments implies greater gender equality, lessened gender stratification, or a conjugal marriage ideology.

Data for this paper come from the 2002 Iran Fertility Transition Survey [IFTS]. The IFTS re-interviewed 50 per cent of women in four selected provinces [Sistan & Baluchistan, West Azarbaijan, Gilan, and Yazd] who had been interviewed in the 2000 Iran Demographic and Health Survey [IDHS]. Thus, the IFTS sample includes approximately 1000 households in both urban and rural areas in each of the provinces. Several reasons justify the selection of the provinces. First, these provinces have displayed very different fertility levels during the period, 1972–1996. A comparison of fertility levels of all provinces with the national average revealed that Sistan & Baluchistan and West Azerbaijan had higher fertility as compared to the total population, while Gilan and Yazd displayed considerably lower fertility than the national level [Abbasi-Shavazi 2000, Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2005]. Second, socio-economic characteristics such as literacy, employment, and access to electricity and safe water vary markedly across these provinces. Sistan & Baluchistan province [located in the south-eastern part of Iran and sharing borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan] stands out with the lowest level of socio-economic development, while Gilan and Yazd approach the highest levels of socioeconomic development in the country [Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald & Hosseini-Chavoshi 2003: 3-4]. See Appendix 1 for more discussion of the characteristics of the selected provinces. The IFTS was conducted during April and May 2002, 18 months after the IDHS, and 5190 questionnaires were completed for eligible women aged 15–49. The IFTS questionnaire included around 100 questions on various demographic and socio-economic characteristics as well as attitudes of women regarding childbearing, marriage, women’s employment and gender equity within and outside the family.

The interviewers were selected from among Health Officers [behvarz] who have been working in Health Houses for several years. Most of these interviewers had participated in the IDHS data collection, thus were familiar with the field, and had accurate knowledge of the households and respondents [particularly in rural areas]. The interviewers were trained by the first and third authors at workshops held in each province. Field supervisors from the Iran Ministry of Health were present in the field at the time of data collection to supervise the interviewer teams and to check the accuracy of the data. A thorough analysis of the data has indicated a high quality of data collection and accuracy of the various demographic measures.

3. Conclusion.

What we can find and must do is reevaluate our values, promote a global oriented morality, and implement appropriate international laws. In this case, human rights legislation becomes of utmost importance. Yet prior to such legislation is the necessity that everyone receives an education which facilities and understanding for diversity and otherness. All human
beings must recognize themselves as inhabitants of one world and act accordingly. Hence, all nations – states, despite their traditions, beliefs, and values, are obligated to give priority to the common interests of human beings in order to preserve all life on Earth. No one can with certainty forecast, the fate of humanity or of our planet. However, the degree to which we are able to influence conditions of life on our planet requires each of us to acknowledge global values and our responsibility for acting on such values and preserving them.

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